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Abstract. This paper presents a static computable general equilibrium (CGE) framework to 
numerically examine the impact of international remittances and the brain drain on poverty 
reduction as well as income inequality in Ghana. The generalized framework with the latest 
Ghanaian input-output table of year 2005 with 59 different production sectors provides the 
following results: On the impact of international remittances, more remittances reduce 
poverty, and expand the Ghanaian economy. On the impact on income inequality, it 
depends on who receives more remittances. If the rural (urban) households receive more 
remittances, then income inequality shrinks (widens). On the impact of the brain drain, it is 
negative to both poverty reduction and income inequality, even if the externality effect of 
the brain drain is taken into account. On the overall impact of both remittances and the 
brain drain in Ghana, income inequality becomes more severe. On the other hand, the 
overall impact on poverty reduction, it depends on the amount of remittances as well as the 
sector where the brain drain occurs. As long as the brain drain occurs in either the education 
or the health sector, then the positive impact of remittances outweighs the negative impact 
of the brain drain. However, if the brain drain occurs in all sectors, then the overall impact 
would result in the damage of Ghanaian economy. Even though the positive impact of 
international remittances is taken into account, the Ghanaian economy has been damaged 
by the brain drain, and emigration from Ghana has resulted in more income inequality and 
lower income. 
Keywords. Ghana, Remittance, Brain Drain, Poverty, Income Inequality, Computable 
General Equilibrium (CGE) Model, Simulation. 
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1. Introduction 
his paper examines the impact of international remittances as well as the 
brain drain on poverty reduction and income inequality in Ghana within a 
static computable general equilibrium (CGE) framework with its latest 
Input-Output Table. 
The increasing trend of international remittances in Ghana can be observed in 
accordance with the same pattern of the number of emigrants, and the positive 
relationship between international remittances and emigration seems mutual, as 
shown in Figure 1 and 2. The increasing trend of inflows of remittances has 
resulted in its relatively more importance and its growing impact on the whole 
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Ghanaian economy. While the slowdown of the growth rate of the global flows of 
remittances is expected in year 2015 due to weak economic growth of Europe as 
well as deterioration of the Russian economy, the World Bank (2015) also 
forecasts that the global flows of remittances will again recover in year 2016 and 
2017 in line with the expected global economic recovery
i
. The increasing trend of 
remittances and an expectation of global economic recovery both imply that 
remittances will play a more important role in Ghana. 
The negative impact of emigration on the country of origin is recognized as the 
brain drain, particularly the impact of outflows of skilled labor on an economy of 
the country of origin. While increasing international remittances can be recognized 
as an injection to Ghana and thus they can be expected to stimulate the Ghanaian 
economy, the increasing number of emigration would reversely result in damaging 
the economy through its brain drain effect. 
Djiofack et al. (2013) has recently found out in their simulations of a CGE 
model that the negative impact of the brain drain would outweigh the positive 
impact of remittances on income in Cameroon based on their parameter values 
estimated with the data of African countries, and they concluded that the overall 
impact of migration on poverty reduction is negative in Cameroon even though the 
positive impact of remittances is taken into account. They also pointed out that an 
increase in remittances would result in an expansion of income inequality in 
Cameroon since a larger ratio of remittances will be sent to relatively richer 
households, which live in the urban area. It is often observed particularly in 
developing countries that income inequality tends to become larger through the 
process of an economic expansion. Indeed income inequality has become wider in 
Ghana recently (Ghana Statistical Service (2014))
ii
. 
In the literature, while it has been argued that increased remittances help 
poverty reduction, the results of the impact of increased remittances on income 
inequality are mixed. Furthermore, the results of the impact of the brain drain on 
poverty reduction are also mixed in the macroeconomics literature. In the current 
literature, they argue that there is a positive externality effect of emigration, and the 
direct negative effect of the brain drain on poverty reduction might be cancelled 
out by the positive externality effect of emigration. Regarding the impact of the 
brain drain on income inequality, no clear conclusion has been obtained in the 
literature yet. 
The expected global economic recovery and rapid globalization over the world 
economy would stimulate more outflows of skilled labor from Ghana as well as 
more international remittances to Ghana. Then, the purpose of this paper is to 
numerically measure the magnitude of the impact not only of international 
remittances but also of the brain drain on poverty reduction and income inequality 
in Ghana. 
In order to specifically examine the impact of international remittances on 
income inequality, this paper explicitly considers several different inputs in 
production such as skilled labor, unskilled labor, capital for agriculture, general 
capital, and land. This paper also takes into account heterogeneity of households in 
the rural and urban areas. Since the latest Input-Output Table is used to specify 
parameter values in our CGE model, simulation results could be quite realistic. 
Indeed, the benchmark model can perfectly capture the actual Ghanaian economy 
within the model. Then the impact of international remittances on income 
inequality is explored. Furthermore, this paper explicitly considers how households 
use increased remittances. As Adams & Cuecuecha (2010; 2013) empirically 
pointed out recently, remittances would be used for particular goods; investment 
goods. The receipt of remittances can cause behavioral changes at the household 
level. 
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On the impact of the brain drain, this paper also considers the externality effect 
of emigration, which is often called the 'brain' effect. This positive externality 
effect has been argued within the endogenous growth theory that emigration has 
not only the negative 'brain drain' effect but also the positive 'brain' effect on the 
country of origin by stimulating more investments on education. 
Our simulation results show as follows. On the impact of international 
remittances on poverty reduction, it is positive. if households use increased 
international remittances only for investment goods such as education, housing, 
and health, as Adams & Cuecuecha (2010; 2013) found, then the positive impact 
on poverty reduction is further stronger. The positive impact on poverty reduction 
is driven through the demand side, and more consumption generated by increased 
remittances stimulates production
iii
. This eventuates in more income of both rural 
and urban households. Income of the rural households increases even when only 
urban households receive additional remittances. 
On the impact of international remittances on income inequality, it depends on 
who receives increased remittances. When the rural (urban) households enjoy more 
remittances, then income inequality becomes smaller (bigger). As Djiofack et al. 
(2013) suggested for the Cameroon case, this is the case for Ghana as well. 
Regarding the impact of the brain drain on poverty reduction, the brain drain 
results in a decrease in GDP, and its impact is thus negative on poverty reduction. 
While the impact of the brain drain from the 'public administration' sector is 
negatively the largest, the negative impact of the brain drain from the 'health' sector 
on the Ghanaian economy is quite small. This is the same result as what Docquier 
& Rapoport (2012) pointed out for African countries. 
On the impact of the brain drain on income inequality, the impact is also 
negative, and the brain drain generates more income inequality. However, the 
magnitude of the negative impact on income inequality is quite small. 
Furthermore, if positive externality of emigration is taken into account, the 
negative impact of the brain drain on both poverty reduction and income inequality 
is weaken. However, our simulation results suggest that under a realistic 
assumption on the magnitude of externality the positive effect of externality is 
limited, and the overall impact of the brain drain is negative to both poverty 
reduction and income inequality. 
On the overall impact of international remittances and the brain drain, income 
inequality becomes more severe by both effects, even if the externality effect of the 
brain drain is taken into account. Regarding the overall impact on poverty 
reduction, it depends on the amount of remittances and the sector where the brain 
drain occurs. As long as the brain drain occurs in either the education or the health 
sector, then the positive impact of remittances outweighs the negative impact of the 
brain drain, thus resulting in poverty reduction. However, if the brain drain occurs 
in all sectors, then the overall impact would result in the damage of Ghanaian 
economy. The negative impact of the brain drain would outweigh the positive 
impact of international remittances when the brain drain occurs in all sectors. Even 
though the positive impact of international remittances is taken into account, the 
Ghanaian economy has also been damaged by the brain drain, and emigration from 
Ghana has resulted in more income inequality and lower income. 
The paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews the literature on 
remittances and the brain drain, and then Section 3 explains the data and 
benchmark model. Section 4 simulates several scenarios with results and 
evaluations. Section 5 concludes the paper. 
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2. The Literature 
The impact of international remittances and migration on economic growth, 
poverty, and income inequality in the countries of origin has growingly received 
great attention in the literature. Rapoport et al. (2006) and Adams (2011) surveyed 
the literature, and they pointed out that the results are quite mixed while a number 
of research have been conducted. 
On the impact of remittances on poverty reduction, however, it is rather more 
straightforward: Remittances seem to reduce poverty (Adams & Page, 2005; 
Acosta et al., 2008; Gupta et al., 2009; and Adams & Cuecuecha, 2013)
iv
. Gupta et 
al (2009) explored the impact of remittances on poverty reduction in Sub-Saharan 
African countries, and they found the positive effect of remittances on poverty 
reduction. Adams & Cuecuecha (2013) studied the impact of remittances on 
investment and poverty in Ghana based on 2005-6 Ghana Living Standard Survey 
(GLSS 5), and they concluded the positive impact on poverty reduction. Adams & 
Cuecuecha (2013) also found out that households in Ghana would spend more at 
the margin on three investment goods: education, housing, and health
v
. 
In terms of the impact of remittances on income inequality, results are really 
mixed (Lipton, 1980; Stark et al., 1988; Taylor 1992; Barham & Boucher, 1998). 
Taylor (1992) explicitly took into account the indirect and the long run effects to 
investigate the full impact of remittances on inequality, and they found an inverted 
U-shaped curve between remittances and inequality over time
vi
. 
The impact of migration of skilled workers from developing countries, which is 
the so-called brain drain, has also been explored in the literature. While there is no 
one-to-one relationship between international remittances and the brain drain, both 
should be obviously related to each other very closely. Docquier & Rapoport 
(2012) reviewed four decades of economic research on the brain drain particularly 
related to development issues, and they summarized the literature consisting of 
three waves over time. The current literature consists of several arguments within 
the endogenous growth framework that the brain drain would eventually generate 
the positive impact on economic growth through its positive externality. Beine et 
al. (2001) and Beine et al. (2008) introduced a positive effect (brain effect) of 
education on a source country caused by an uncertainty in the migration 
opportunity as well as the conventional negative effect (drain effect) into the 
endogenous growth model. Faini (2007) argued the relationship between 
remittances and the brain drain, and found out empirically that the brain drain was 
associated with a smaller propensity to remit
vii
. 
Regarding the research on Ghana and Africa in terms of international 
remittances and the brain drain, in addition to Gupta et al. (2009), and Adam & 
Cuecuecha (2013), Agbola (2013) and Djiofack et al. (2013) should be noted. 
Agbola (2013) empirically found out the positive impact of remittances on 
economic growth as well as the crowding out effect of the conventional 
government policy on the private activities in Ghana, and he argued that the 
government spending should be shifted onto more production-enhancing sectors 
such as education and health related sectors. Djiofack et al. (2013) constructed a 
computable general equilibrium (CGE) model
viii
for Cameroon with parameter 
values estimated with the African country data set, and presented several 
suggestive results for African countries. In particular, they concluded that the 
negative impact of the brain drain on productivity outweighs the positive impact of 
remittances on increased income in African countries, and thus outflows of skilled 
workers (brain drain) would ultimately reduce income in Africa. They also found 
out that the effect of remittances on poverty reduction is quite limited, and further 
that remittances would result in an expansion of income inequality due to the fact 
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that the amount of remittances sent by skilled workers abroad is much larger than 
that by unskilled workers and also that the larger amount of remittances by skilled 
workers will be sent to the urban area rather than the rural area. Since households 
living in the urban area are richer than those in the rural area, remittances would 
further widen the income gap between the urban and rural areas. 
This paper tries to develop a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model to 
numerically measure the impact of international remittances and the brain drain on 
poverty reduction and income inequality for Ghana. While the literature above 
consists of studies basically with econometrics techniques, this paper employs a 
multisector general equilibrium model. While Djiofack et al. (2013) 
econometrically estimated parameter values for Cameroon with the African 
country data set, this paper uses the latest Input-Output table of Ghana with 59 
private sectors for parameter specification, so that the benchmark model can 
perfectly re-produce the actual Ghanaian economy within our model. Any 
simulations cannot be convincing without a good-fitted benchmark model. Then 
this paper uses the well-fitted benchmark model to simulate several scenarios about 
international remittances and the brain drain in Ghana to explore the impact of 
remittances and the brain drain on poverty reduction and income inequality. 
In addition to the difference in the method and the data for estimation of 
parameter values from Djiofack et al. (2013), this paper explicitly takes into 
account the following two key issues argued in the current literature on remittances 
and the brain drain: This paper explicitly considers how households use increased 
remittances. As Adams & Cuecuecha (2010; 2013) empirically pointed out 
recently, remittances would be used for particular goods; investment goods. The 
receipt of remittances can cause behavioral changes at the household level. 
Furthermore, on the impact of the brain drain, this paper also considers the positive 
externality effect of emigration, which is often called the brain effect. This positive 
externality effect has been argued within the endogenous growth theory that the 
brain drain has not only the negative but also the positive impact on the country of 
origin by stimulating more investments on education. 
 
3. Numerical Analysis 
In order to obtain numerical effects of international remittances, and the brain 
drain, this paper uses the latest input-output table of Ghana within a general 
equilibrium framework, in order to make our simulation analysis realistic. By using 
the actual input-output table of Ghana, the paper has successfully realized the real 
economy within the model. This paper employs the conventional static computable 
general equilibrium (CGE) model with the actual input-output table of Ghana of 
year 2005. Note that all parameter values in the model are calculated by using the 
actual data, so that the calculated values of endogenous variables obtained within 
the model also become quite realistic. 
3.1. Data 
The latest input-output table of Ghana of year 2005 with 59 different 




The World Bank (2006) points out that the true size of international remittances 
flows through formal and informal channels may be much higher than the formal 
size by perhaps 50 % or more. The Bank of Ghana reported that the total size of 
private transfers in year 2005 was 1549.76 million US dollars, and also that more 
than 80 % of the amount of received remittances was sent privately and only 13 % 
was carried out through banks or money transfer agencies. In the latest input-output 
table of Ghana of year 2005, while there are items of official international 
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remittances to rural and urban households through banks and money transfer 
agencies, the values of these items are relatively too small compared to the reported 
value by the Bank of Ghana. Then private transfers from abroad are categorized in 
exports of sector 51 in the input-output table, and it is assumed in this paper that 
the amount of private transfers is also included in international remittances, in 
order to capture the true size of international remittances
x
. Table 1 shows the 
amount of international remittances obtained from the input-output table of Ghana 
of year 2005 after the modification of the treatment of exports of sector 51. As the 
table shows, the amount of international remittances to the urban households is 
much higher than that to the rural households, and the total income per capita in the 
urban area is also much higher than that in the rural area, as shown in Table 2. This 
implies, as Djiofack et al. (2013) pointed in the Cameroon case, that more 
international remittances would result in more income inequality, since more 





The general equilibrium model consists of 59 different production sectors, 
heterogenous households, and the government. Each of 59 production sectors uses 
self-employed, unskilled labor, skilled labor, land, agriculture specific capital, 
general capital, land, and intermediate production goods in its production in order 
to maximize its profits. Each production sector optimally determines how much it 
exports its own good, how much it imports goods for its production, and how much 
it sells its own good domestically. 
Households are heterogenous, depending on the place where they live; the rural 
area household, and the urban area household. Each household maximizes its 
utility which is defined over 59 different goods produced by 59 different 
production sectors. Disposal income of rural and urban households consists of after 
tax labor and capital income, transfers from the government, and remittances. 
Remittances include internal (from Ghana) and international (from abroad) 
remittances, both of which are treated separately. The government imposes taxes 
and tariffs on and gives subsidies to 59 different production sectors. The 
government also imposes a labor income tax on the households in the rural and 
urban areas, and gives transfers to them. The total tax revenue is used for its 
expenditure. 59 different commodity markets and factor markets are all fully 
competitive, so that all prices are determined at the fully competitive level. 59 
different production sectors and the heterogenous households take all prices, tax 
rates, and subsidy rates as given. 
The benchmark case should reflect the real Ghanaian economy in order to make 
the subsequent simulation scenarios realistic. Thus, the benchmark model should 
carefully be calibrated until the calculated values of all endogenous variables 
within the model become close to the actual values. Table 3-1 to 3-3 show the 
calculated model values as well as the corresponding actual values in year 2005. 
 
4. Simulation Analysis 
4.1. The Impact of Remittances (Simulation I) 
In order to capture the pure impact of international remittances on poverty 
reduction and income inequality, it is assumed that only the amount of remittances 
increases in the following simulations, and outflows of skilled labor, namely the 
brain drain, remains unchanged. 
As Djiofack et al. (2013) pointed out, more remittances to households in the 
urban area would induce more income inequality, since households in the urban 
area are richer than those in the rural area. Thus, the impact of an increase in 
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remittances is separately examined in the following simulations, depending on 
whether remittances are sent to rural or urban households. 
Furthermore, the treatment of increased remittances also matters. In the 
literature there is an argument on how households use remittances; for 
consumption of usual goods, or of particular goods. If the former case happens in 
Ghana, then increased remittances can be treated simply as an increase in disposal 
income. On the other hand, if the latter case is observed in Ghana, then increased 
remittances should be treated differently. As Adams & Cuecuecha (2010; 2013) 
empirically pointed out recently, remittances would be used for particular goods; 
investment goods. They found out in their research (2013) that remittances would 
be used particularly for education, housing, and health in Ghana. Thus, simulations 
are conducted based on two assumptions. In the first simulation (Simulation I-1), it 
is assumed that increased remittances are simply treated as an increase in disposal 
income. Then, another simulation (Simulation I-2) is conducted again by assuming 
that increased remittances are used only for more investments on education, 
housing, and health. Two different simulations of the impact of international 
remittances are thus as follows: 
Simulation I-1: Increased international remittances are transferred to rural and 
urban households separately. The increased remittances are treated as an increase 
in disposal income, so that households use them for more consumption of all 
goods.     
Simulation I-2: Increased international remittances are transferred to rural and 
urban households separately. The increased remittances are treated differently from 
disposal income, so that households use them for more consumption of only 
education, housing and health goods. 
Table 4 shows the results. The impact on poverty reduction is measured by the 
equivalent variation and GDP. While the change in GDP indicates the impact on 
poverty reduction of the whole economy, the equivalent variation shows the 
magnitude of poverty reduction for the rural and urban households separately. The 
impact on income inequality is measured by Gini Coefficient in this paper. 
On the impact on poverty reduction, as long as households treat increased 
remittances as an increase in disposal income, then the impact of remittances is 
relatively limited in comparison with the case that households use increased 
remittances only for investment goods such as education, housing, and health, 
which corresponds to what Adams & Cuecuecha (2013) found for Ghana. In such a 
case the impact of remittances on poverty reduction is much stronger. While more 
remittances always result in poverty reduction of the whole economy (higher GDP) 
irrespective of who receives them, the impact is larger when urban households 
receive them. The positive impact on poverty reduction is driven through the 
demand side in our simulations, as Agbola (2013) empirically found. More 
consumption generated by increased remittances stimulates production, and 
eventuates in more income. This demand side effect becomes stronger when urban 
households receive more remittances. Income of the rural households also 
increases even when only urban households receive additional remittances due to 
this demand side effect. For instance, Simulation I-2 shows that when remittances 
to urban households increase by 30% then not only income of the urban households 
but also that of the rural households increase by 0.4376 million US dollars and 
0.3092 million US dollars, respectively. 
On the impact on income inequality, it depends on who receives increased 
remittances. When the rural (urban) households enjoy more remittances, then 
income inequality becomes smaller (bigger). As Djiofack et al. (2013) suggested 
for the Cameroon case, this is the case for Ghana as well. While the direction of the 
impact is the same between Simulations I-1 and I-2, the magnitude is different. 
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While income inequality always shrinks when the rural households receive 
increased remittances, the positive impact on income equality is smaller when more 
remittances are used for consumption of only education, housing, and health 
(Simulation I-2). This is because the demand side effect becomes weaker when 
increased remittances are used for consumption of only investment goods, thus 
resulting in the smaller positive impact on income inequality. 
On the other hand, when more remittances are used only for such consumption, 
the impact on income inequality negatively becomes the largest when increased 
remittances are transferred to the urban households. This is because the demand 
side effect of more consumption by the urban households does not spread over the 
whole economy when the urban households use increased remittances only for 
more investment goods, and then the impact of the demand side effect to the rural 
households is relatively weakened. The weakened positive effect on the rural 
households and more remittances to the urban households jointly result in the worst 
outcome on income inequality. 
4.2. The Impact of the Brain Drain (Simulation II) 
Recent studies argue that the brain drain has two contrary effects: The direct 
effect negatively works on productivity in the economy of origin. This negative 
effect is often called the 'drain effect', and it reduces productivity in the short-run. 
On the other hand, in association with such a negative effect in the short-run, it 
stimulates more investments on education in the country of origin in the long-run. 
Individuals invest more on education since they expect to obtain more 
opportunities to emigrate their home country if they are more educated. However, 
if some of them cannot leave their home country against their expectation, then 
they could contribute to the improvement in productivity in their home country. 
This positive effect is often called 'brain effect', and this positive effect of 
externality results in higher economic growth in the long-run. 
Since these two effects work in the opposite directions on the country of origin, 
two separate simulations are conducted in this paper. Firstly, it is assumed that 
skilled labor leaves Ghana without any positive externality. This case is examined 
in Simulation II-1. In Simulation II-1, only the 'drain effect' of emigration is taken 
into account. Then, in Simulation II-2 the impact of positive externality is taken 
into account when skilled labor leaves Ghana. In this simulation, the 'brain effect' is 
also considered. In Simulation II-2, it is assumed that happens in the following 
way: When skilled labor leaves a production sector in Ghana, then unskilled labor 
in the same sector can fully replace the skilled labor who left the country. This 
implies that the marginal productivity of unskilled labor increases up to that of 
skilled labor. For instance, this assumption implies that if a 30% of skilled labor 
leaves a sector then exactly a 30% of unskilled labor in the same sector becomes 
skilled. Then, a 70% of unskilled labor still remains unskilled in the sector. Since it 
is assumed that all prices are determined in corresponding fully competitive 
markets, newly skilled labor receives higher labor income. This assumption is 
called 'perfect' externality in this paper, and it seems unrealistic. In reality, even 
though positive externality is observed, the actual situation could be between 
Simulation II-1 and Simulation II-2. However, since it seems quite difficult to 
determine to the extent how much positive externality exists in actual Ghana, it is 
simply assumed that perfect externality exists in Simulation II-2, in order to be 
compared with Simulation II-1. 
Table 5 shows top ten sectors which most pay labor income to skilled labor in 
Ghana based on the Input-Output Table of year 2005. The impact of outflows of 
medical doctors from Ghana on the Ghanaian economy is one of the most 
important issues in Ghana. Thus, in the following simulations, the impact of the 
Journal of Economics and Political Economy 
 JEPE, 3(2), I. Dadson, & R.R. Kato, p.211-241. 
219 
219 
brain drain from 'public administration (sector 57)', 'education (sector 58)', and 
'health (sector 59)' is examined. Then the following two simulations are explored: 
Simulation II-1: The brain drain either from 'public administration (sector 57)', 
'education (sector 58)', 'health (sector 59)', or all 59 sectors occurs. However, there 
exists no externality. Only the 'drain effect' is take into account. 
Simulation II-2: The brain drain either from 'public administration (sector 57)', 
'education (sector 58)', 'health (sector 59)', or all 59 sectors occurs. Furthermore, 
there exists perfect externality. Not only the 'drain effect' but also 'brain effect' are 
taken into account. 
Table 6 shows the results. When there is no positive externality (with no 'brain 
effect'), GDP decreases, and the impact on poverty reduction is negative. Welfare 
of both rural and urban households decreases. In accordance with their relative 
sizes of income, the negative impact of the brain drain from the 'public 
administration' sector on GDP is most severe. On the other hand, the negative 
impact of the brain drain from the 'health' sector on the Ghanaian economy is 
limited. The negative impact of outflows of medical doctors from Ghana has been 
argued in Ghana. However, as long as its impact on the Ghanaian economy is 
concerned, the magnitude of the impact is not so large,
xii
as Docquier & Rapoport 
(2012) pointed out for African countries. 
Regarding the impact on income inequality, it is also negative, while the 
magnitude is much smaller than the case of remittances. The Ghanaian economy is 
damaged by the 'drain effect', and income of both rural and urban households 
decreases. Table 6 shows that income of the rural households decreases more than 
that of the urban households by the direct 'drain effect'. 
On the other hand, when perfect externality, namely the 'brain effect', is also 
taken into account, the above negative impact of the brain drain is weakened, as the 
result of Simulation II-2 shows in Table 6. Due to the strong assumption of the 
perfect externality effect, the brain drain eventually reduces poverty slightly, and it 
also results in the slight improvement in income inequality. 
However, such results have been obtained based on the strong assumption of 
perfect externality. Since the positive impact on poverty reduction as well as 
income inequality is quite limited even under the strong assumption of perfect 
externality (Simulation II-2). In reality, even if some externality exists, the actual 
Ghanaian economy would be the case between Simulation II-1 and Simulation II-2. 
Thus, the actual Ghanaian economy is likely to have suffered from the brain drain 
even though externality is considered. 
4.3. The Overall Impact of Remittances and the Brain Drain 
This section tries to combine the results obtained in the above two sections in 
order to numerically measure the overall impact of international remittances and 
the brain drain on poverty reduction as well as income inequality. Djiofack et al. 
(2013) found out that the negative impact of the brain drain would outweigh the 
positive impact of remittances on the Cameroon economy. While more brain drain 
is associated with more remittances, Faini (2007) and Adams (2009) pointed out 
that more skilled workers tend to remit less. 
Before showing the numerical results of the overall impact, Table 7 shows the 
qualitative results of the above simulations. Table 7 indicates that as long as the 
urban households receive international remittances then the overall impact on 
income inequality seems negative. On the other hand, when the urban households 
receive remittances, then the overall impact on poverty reduction depends on the 
relative magnitude of the positive impact and the negative impact of the brain 
drain. Table 8 shows the numerical results of the overall impact
xiii
. As Table 7 
suggests, when the urban households receive more remittances, then income 
inequality indeed becomes worse, even though perfect externality is assumed. 
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Since it is not realistic to assume that only rural households receive international 
remittances, this numerical result shows that the overall impact of international 
remittances and the brain drain has induced more income inequality in Ghana. 
Emigration from Ghana has resulted in more income inequality. On the impact on 
poverty reduction, the overall impact depends on where the brain drain occurs. If 
the brain drain occurs either from the education sector or the health sector, then the 
positive impact of international remittances would outweigh the negative impact of 
the brain drain, thus resulting in poverty reduction. This is the opposite result to 
Djiofack et al. (2013) for the Cameroon case. However, if the brain drain occurs 
only in the public administration sector, the result depends on how much the urban 
households receive international remittances as well as how much the positive 
externality effect of the brain drain is strong. Furthermore, it would be more 
realistic to assume that the brain drain occurs not only in the public administration 
sector but also in other sectors. The last several columns show this case, where the 
brain drain occurs in all 59 sectors. The overall impact of international remittances 
and the brain drain tends to be negative when the brain drain occurs in all sectors, 
even though some positive externality is taken into account. The comparison 
between the no externality and the perfect externality cases indicates that even if 
more than half positive externality is taken into account GDP would be reduced by 
the overall impact of international remittances and the brain drain. This implies that 
emigration from Ghana has also induced the damage of the Ghanaian economy 
even if the positive impact of international remittances is considered. 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
This paper has presented a computable general equilibrium (CGE) framework to 
numerically examine the impact of remittances and the brain drain on poverty 
reduction, welfare, and income inequality in Ghana. This paper has used the latest 
Input-Output table of Ghana of year 2005 with 59 different production sectors to 
reproduce the actual Ghanaian economy within the model. 
The results obtained in this paper are as follows: On the impact of international 
remittances on poverty reduction, it is positive. if households use increased 
international remittances only for investment goods such as education, housing, 
and health, as Adams & Cuecuecha (2010; 2013) found, then the positive impact 
on poverty reduction is further stronger. The positive impact on poverty reduction 
is driven through the demand side, and more consumption generated by increased 
remittances stimulates production. This eventuates in more income of both rural 
and urban households. Income of the rural households increases even when only 
urban households receive additional remittances. 
On the impact of international remittances on income inequality, it depends on 
who receives increased remittances. When the rural (urban) households enjoy more 
remittances, then income inequality becomes smaller (bigger). As Djiofack et al. 
(2013) suggested for the Cameroon case, this is the case for Ghana as well. 
Regarding the impact of the brain drain on poverty reduction, the brain drain 
results in a decrease in GDP, and its impact is thus negative on poverty reduction. 
While the impact of the brain drain from the 'public administration' sector is 
negatively the largest, the negative impact of the brain drain from the 'health' sector 
on the Ghanaian economy is quite small. This is the same result as what Docquier 
& Rapoport (2012) pointed out for African countries. 
On the impact of the brain drain on income inequality, the impact is also 
negative, and the brain drain generates more income inequality. However, the 
magnitude of the negative impact on income inequality is quite small. 
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Furthermore, if positive externality of emigration is taken into account, the 
negative impact of the brain drain on both poverty reduction and income inequality 
is weaken. However, our simulation results suggest that under a realistic 
assumption on the magnitude of externality the positive effect of externality is 
limited, and the overall impact of the brain drain is negative to both poverty 
reduction and income inequality. 
On the overall impact of international remittances and the brain drain, income 
inequality becomes more severe by both effects, even if the externality effect of the 
brain drain is taken into account. Regarding the overall impact on poverty 
reduction, it depends on the amount of remittances and the sector where the brain 
drain occurs. As long as the brain drain occurs in either the education or the health 
sector, then the positive impact of remittances outweighs the negative impact of the 
brain drain, thus resulting in poverty reduction. However, if the brain drain occurs 
in all sectors, then the overall impact would result in the damage of Ghanaian 
economy. The negative impact of the brain drain would outweigh the positive 
impact of international remittances when the brain drain occurs in all sectors. Even 
though the positive impact of international remittances is taken into account, the 
Ghanaian economy has also been damaged by the brain drain, and emigration from 
Ghana has resulted in more income inequality and lower income. 
While this paper has used the Ghanaian input-output table, it would be notable 
to mention that it is applicable to all other countries in Africa in order to investigate 
the effect of remittances and the brain drain. Furthermore, the model can easily be 
generalized by incorporating policy instruments to examine the impact of policy 
changes such as tax reforms. 
Finally drawbacks of this paper should be mentioned: The model is static, and it 
seems difficult to fully investigate the impact over time. As argued in the literature, 
the overall impact of remittances lasts over time. This implies that the framework is 
expected to be dynamic. It has also been assumed that labor supply is completely 
inelastic and immobile among different production sectors. This implies that the 
framework cannot capture the impact of the brain drain from a particular sector. If 
the brain drain is severe in a particular sector, then skilled labor would move over 
different sectors in reality. 
However, by using the latest Input-Output Table of Ghana, this paper has 
developed a well-fitted benchmark model within a CGE framework, and it has 
numerically argued the impact of international remittances and the brain drain on 
poverty reduction and income inequality within a theoretical framework. It has also 
taken into account two key issues in the literature; behavioral changes towards 
remittances and externality of the brain drain. Since the benchmark model has 
successfully reproduced the real Ghanaian economy within the model, the 
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Appendix : Tables and Figures 
 
 
Figure 1. International Remittances 





Figure 2. The Number of Emigrants from Ghana 
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To Rural houeholds 45.11181696 168.34958 213.46139
Urban households 175.726162 655.77995 831.50611
total 220.8379789 824.12952 1044.9675
To Rural houeholds 3.268972244 12.199245 15.468217
Urban households 20.91978119 78.069041 98.988822
total 24.18875343 90.268286 114.45704
Source: Input-Output Table of Year 2005
Per a million population
The amout of informal remittances is obtained based on the assumption that the amount of
exports in sector 51 is treated as informal international remittances
Income: in million USD, and Population in million
Population Income
Rural houeholds 13.8 5054.3708





Source: Input-Output Table Year 2005 and GLSS 5
Per a million population
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Table 3.1. Final Consumption Goods by the Rural Household in the Benchmark 
Model, 59,,2,1; iQP i
Q
i  
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Table 3.2. Final Consumption Goods by the Urban Household in the Benchmark 
Model, 59,,2,1; iQP i
Q
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Table 3.3. Economic Values of the Benchmark Model 






Table 4. The Impact of International Remittances 





Rural households 5054.370819 5054.370819
Urban households 5850.381344 5850.381344
Private Sector
Rural households 231.8894 231.8894
Urban households 138.6556 138.6556
Government Sector 745.4039 745.4039







Unit: a million USD except
Gini Coeffficient
benchmark
10% increase 20% increase 30% increase 10% increase 20% increase 30% increase
Welfare (Equivalent Variation)
rural household 0.0000 0.0320 0.0653 0.0996 0.0087 0.0214 0.0341
urban household 0.0000 -0.0053 -0.0105 -0.0153 0.0794 0.1587 0.2366
GDP 11429.3131 11429.0421 11428.8074 11429.8454 11431.8223 11437.6802 11443.7534
Gini Coefficient 39.40 37.94 36.41 34.86 42.48 45.40 48.27
GDP -0.0024% -0.0044% 0.0047% 0.0220% 0.0732% 0.1263%
Gini Coefficient -3.7142% -7.5958% -11.5105% 7.8284% 15.2374% 22.5152%
Welfare (Equivalent Variation)
rural household 0.0000 0.0479 0.1007 0.1497 0.0968 0.2050 0.3092
urban household 0.0000 0.0189 0.0439 0.0686 0.1625 0.3084 0.4376
GDP 11429.3131 11461.8917 11507.2452 11553.1977 11594.1791 11781.1238 11968.3522
Gini Coefficient 39.40 38.31 37.06 35.82 43.45 47.10 50.58
GDP 0.2850% 0.6819% 1.0839% 1.4425% 3.0781% 4.7163%
Gini Coefficient -2.7760% -5.9338% -9.0825% 10.2910% 19.5457% 28.3720%
Simulation    I  -  2
 (More remittances are used for more consumption of only investment goods)
% increase from the benchmark value
increase in remittances to the RURAL
household only
increase in remittances to the URBAN
household only
Simulation    I  -  1
 (More remittances are treated as an increase in disposal income)
% increase from the benchmark value
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Table 6. The Impact of the Brain Drain 
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Table 7. The Qualitative Impact on Poverty Reduction and Income Inequality 
 
  
Poverty Reduction Income Inequality
International Remittances to: Rural Household positive positive
Urban Household very positive negative
Brain Drain with: No Externality negative negative
Perfect Externality slightly positive slightly positive
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i The World Bank (2006) also pointed out that the true size of remittances flows through formal and 
informal channels may be much higher than the formal size by perhaps 50 percent or more. This 
implies, as many researchers have recognized, that the impact of remittances on the world economy 
is getting more important. 
ii  All survey data conducted in the past (Ghana Living Standards Survery (GLSS) round 3 
(1991/1992), 4 (1998/1999), and 5 (2005/2006) showed the Gini Coefficient improved over time 
until GLSS 6 (2012/2013) was produced. 
iii Agbola (2013) also found the same result for Ghana in his empirical study. 
iv Freund & Spatafora (2008) examined the impact of the transaction cost on remittances, and Mamun 
et al. (2015) recently argued that the development of the financial sector is important for stimulating 
remittances.  
v Adams & Cuecuecha (2010) investigated the same issue for Guatemala, and they reached the same 
result. Kabki et al (2004) investigated the behavior of households regarding how to spend 
remittances for Netherlands-based Ghanaian migrants based on interviews, and they also concluded 
that remittances would be spent mainly on investment goods such as housing and family business in 
the country of origin. 
vi While the context is different, Adams (2009) found an inverted U-shaped relationship between per 
capita GDP and per capita remittances, and also found out that more skilled (educated) migrants 
remit less. Faini (2007) also obtained the same result. Mckenzie & Rapoport (2007) explicitly 
studied the network effect, which is smiliar to the externality effect in Taylor (1992), and they also 
found an inverted U-shaped curve between the number of migrants and inequality. 
vii Docquier et al. (2007) estimated the determinants of the brain drain, and they argued that not only 
the physical distance but also political instability would be key elements. 
viii Guha (2013) constructed a DSGE model to investigate the Dutch Disease effect of remittances. 
ix Our SAM can be provided upon request. 
x The total value of exports of sector 51 was 7492.086 billion in GHC (old Ghana Cedis), which is 
equal to 173.21 million US dollars, in the original input-output table of year 2005. This size is 
relatively very large compared to the amount of exports of other sectors due to the fact that it 
contains private transfers from abroad. Then, this amount is assumed to be treated as informal 
remittances in the paper. 
xi The detailed model is given in Appendix. 
xii There are obviously other negative impacts of the brain drain from the 'health' sector on the country 
of origin such as the hygiene level and the mortality rate of the country. Such impacts cannot be 
included in our analysis. 
xiii Table 8 shows the result based on the assumption that increased remittances are used for more 
consumption of only education, housing, and health goods. 
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